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2A-6/15/77 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
x 
In the Matter of 
MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATION OF THE PAID FIRE DEPART-
MENT OF THE CITY OF YONKERS, NEW YORK, INC., 
LOCAL 628 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE 
FIGHTERS, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
- and -
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Case No. U-2079 
CITY OF YONKERS, 
Charging Party. 
x 
The charge herein was filed by the City of Yonkers (City) on 
April 12, 1976. It alleges that the Mutual Aid Association of the Paid Fire 
Department of the City of Yonkers, New York, Inc., Local 628 International 
Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO (Local 628) violated Section 209-a.2(b) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by refusing to negotiate 
in good faith in that it insisted upon receiving benefits automatically 
pursuant to an illegal parity clause. The clause in question is Article VII, 
Section 3 of an agreement between the parties and executed by them on 
December 17, 1973, and is referred to as the 'Favored Nations' clause.— 
Pursuant to that agreement, Local 628 had sought to reopen the 
agreement, and on April 26, 1974 it filed a notice of intent to arbitrate. 
1/ In pertinent part that clause provides that employees in another bargaining 
unit should be covered by a contract which provides 
"...wages and fringes that in total are greater than those received 
by the members of this agreement then, at the option of the Union, 
this agreement may be reopened for re-negotiation, but only as to 
such additional benefits, and for no other purpose. 
"The parties agree that in the event they are unable to resolve 
any issue reopened for re-negotiation under the provision or whether 
this agreement should be reopened within 30 days after the issue is 
raised, such issue shall be submitted to binding arbitration...." 
[Emphasis supplied] •A^^i'l 
ft*-
V-
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Eventually, the dispute was submitted to arbitration but not until the 
City's application to stay arbitration had been rejected by both the 
Supreme Court and the Appellate Division. Between June 18, 1975 and 
December 4, 1975 there were seven arbitration sessions and on December 16, 
1975 an arbitration award was issued which provided for increases to unit 
employees comparable to those contained in a contract between the City and 
the fiire officers. Oh January 30, 1976, Local 628 made.a" If6"tx6n"plirsuant" " 
to CPLR Section 7510 to confilrm the arbitration award; it was confirmed on 
July 16, 1976. 
The hearing officer dismissed the charge on the basis of his 
conclusion that the 'Favored Nations' clause is not a prohibited parity 
clause, saying: 
"On its face, the language of the clause here in dispute 
is not prohibited since the reopening occurs only at the 
option of respondent and it is not automatic." 
Moreover, even once reopened, there would be no automatic increase. 
The City specifies fourteen exceptions to the hearing officer's 
decision. Several are directed to the hearing officer's ultimate conclusion 
of law or to procedural points that are of no consequence. The essence of 
the City's position is its fourth exception: "The Hearing Officer declined 
to look behind the language of the 'Favored Nations' parity clause to 
determine that the clause was a clause agreeing to- parity." As an allegation 
of fact, this statement is accurate. The hearing officer himself wrote: 
"... the charging party seeks that I look behind the language 
of the clause itself and find it illegal because the 
arbitrator found that the firefighters were 'entitled' 
to a dollar-for-dollar increase. This I decline to do...." 
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The exception cannot be sustained because the hearing officer was correct. 
Having heard the parties' arguments and read their briefs as well as 
the record, we determine that the charge was not timely. Section 204.1 of 
our Rules provides that an improper practice charge may be filed only within 4 
months of the conduct complained of. Nothing that occurred at the time of 
the execution of the agreement on December 17, 1973 or prior thereto, took 
place within the limitation on the filing of the charge on April 12, 1976. 
Assuming arguendo that the evidence would establish that Local 628 sought to 
have the 'Favored Nations' clause interpreted as if it were a prohibited 
parity clause, the ensuing violation would have occurred on April 26, 1974, 
when it sought to commence arbitration or even earlier when it sought to obtain 
an increase through direct negotiations. In either event, the charge would not 
be timely. Finally, assuming that neither during negotiations nor at the time 
when it sought arbitration did Local 628 reveal its design to treat the 
'Favored Nations' clause as a prohibited parity clause, its improper conduct 
would have had to be revealed during the arbitration hearings when it 
-attempted to persuade the arbitrator that he should interpret the contract in 
a manner that would make it illegal. This could not have been done later than 
December 4, 1975, which was the date of the final session of the arbitration 
hearing. This date, too, is more than four months prior to the filing of 
the charge. 
Once again, assuming arguendo that on December 16, 1975, the 
arbitrator interpreted the 'Favored Nations' clause in such a way as to make it 
a prohibited clause but that he did so without any arguing by Local 628,the impro-
priety, if any, would not under these circumstances be attributable to Local 628 The 
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only conduct of Local 628 that might be relevant to the charge herein which 
occurred within four months of the charge was the motion it made on January 
30, 1976, pursuant to CPLR Section 7510 to confirm the arbitration award. 
In making that motion, Local 628 relied upon the arbitration award; however, 
this does not necessarily indicate its endorsement of the assumed reasoning 
of the arbitrator that he was bound by a parity clause. 
The making of the motion to confirm the award was not an improper 
practice. All other relevant conduct of Local 628 occurred more than four 
months prior to the filing of the charge. 
Accordingly, the charge herein is dismissed. 
Dated: New York, New York 
June 15, 1977 
y^U' AJ/AA*~^^ 
IDA KLAUS 
STATE OF NEW YORK #2B-6/15/77 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of the COLUMBIA COUNTY CHAPTER 
OF THE CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. nFCT^TON AND ORDFR 
AND THE CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, "0AKD DECISION AND ORDER 
INC., : 
Upon the Charge of Violat ion of Section 210.1 ; _, „T _ _..„.. 
% *.T- n - -i S •
 T Case No. D-0135 
of the Cxvil Service Law. : 
Columbia County Chapter of the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc. (Chapter) filed a charge alleging that the employer, County of 
Columbia (County), had violated Sections 209-a.l(c) and (d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). The gravamen of the charge was that 
the employer had entered into negotiations with a fixed intent to freeze 
wages of unit employees and it refused to discuss proposals of the Chapter 
while granting wage increases to noil-unit employees*. 
Counsel to the Public Employment Relations Board (Board) charged 
the Chapter and the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) with 
violating Section 210.1 of the Act on the ground that during the period June 
8 to 16, 1976 they caused, instigated, encouraged, condoned and engaged in 
a strike against the County of Columbia. Both CSEA and the Chapter submitted 
an answer denying the alleged violation and claiming that the County had 
been guilty of extreme provocation. After a hearing, the hearing officer 
dismissed the improper practice charge filed by the Chapter. He also 
concluded that the Chapter and CSEA had engaged in a strike as charged and 
that the Chapter and CSEA had failed to establish acts of extreme provocation 
of the County that would detract from their responsibility in engaging in 
a work stoppage. The Chapter and CSEA jointly filed exceptions to so much of 
the hearing officer's decision as found that they should be penalized for 
violating Section 210.1 of the Act and that the penalty reflect the impact 
of the strike as well as the absence of extreme provocation. The e:me.p>frions 
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were (1) that the evidence upon which the hearing officer relied in concluding 
a strike had occurred was improperly received on the ground'that "it was 
hearsay and additionally, inferential hearsay.", (2) that the improper 
practice charge should have been sustained because "the County entered into 
negotiations with a fixed intent to freeze wages in 1976 and refused to 
budge from this position throughout the negotiations.", and (3) that "The 
Hearing Officer erred in concluding that CSEA loaned the money to the Unit 
which it distributed during the strike." 
In support of its first exception, CSEA argues that the admission of 
Exhibit 6 into evidence to support the conclusion that a strike of the 
County employees took place was error in that there was no proper foundation 
for the admission of this exhibit into evidence. Exhibit 6 is a list compiled 
by the County Treasurer of those employees whom the Chief Executive Officer 
of the County had determined to have been on strike pursuant to Section 
210.2 of the Act. However, it is unnecessary for us to reach the question of 
the admissibility of this exhibit because even without it there is 
ample evidence in the record to support the conclusion that a strike of 
County employees took place from June 8 to 16 and that both the Chapter and 
CSEA did cause, instigate, encourage and condone that strike. 
During the period in issue, out of 70 employees in the1 Social Service v. 
Department only an average of 18 per day reported to work and in the County health 
facility, Pine Haven Home, less than one-half of the normal complement 
reported for work. The regional supervisor of CSEA, Corcoran, led the 
picketers '• in front of the court house; during the strike, unit employees 
were observed picketing and carrying signs bearing the placard "CSEA on 
Strike"; a van owned by CSEA was observed at various picket locations with 
its loud speaker announcing that employees of the County were on strike; 
during the strike, picketers prevented deliveries from being made a£ lihe.,™ 
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health facility, and at other locations blocked vehicles from entering 
County premises; Carlson, a collective bargaining specialist employed by 
CSEA, stated that they were "calling a strike". Indeed, Corcoran, at the 
conclusion of negotiations settling the dispute agreed to remove the pickets at 
Pine Haven Home, thus indicating his and a fortioiri CSEA's control of the 
strike pickets. The evidence seems abundantly clear that the charged employee 
organizations called and supported the strike. Further, the record is barren 
of-any credible evidence that the employee organizations tried to prevent the 
work stoppage or make any good faith efforts to terminate it. i'Rather they used 
the strike to bolster and enhance their negotiating position. Thus, we conclud 
that the hearing officer's finding that the Chapter and CSEA had engaged in a 
strike in violation of Section 210 is directly supported by the record, apart 
from consideration of Exhibit 6. 
As to the second exception, the hearing officer, in resolving issues 
of credibility with respect to conflicts in the testimony credited the 
County's witness that the only topic which the County refused to discuss was 
that of agency shop, which is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. The 
fact that the County maintained a position of no wage increase for 1976 does 
not of itself provide a basis for the conclusion of a breach of a duty to 
negotiate in good faith. In fact, as noted by the hearing officer, 
"the Chapter aborted any possibility for meaningful 
negotiations when it walked out during the first actual 
negotiating session. It was not until the fact-finding 
hearing, and later at the legislative hearing, that the 
County had an opportunity to fully explain and justify 
its position, including the rationale for granting pay 
raises to non-unit employees." 
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It would seem that CSEA misconstrues the duty of good faith negotiating 
by equating adamancy or hard bargaining with a failure to negotiate in good 
faith. There is no basis in the record-to conclude that the County approached 
the bargaining table lacking a serious desire to reach an agreement or that 
it failed to make sincere efforts to achieve it. 
With regard- to the third exception, we agree with the exception-of^ 
CSEA that there is no evidence in the record to establish that the money loaned 
by CSEA to the Chapter unit was distributed to the members during the strike, 
and thus was not a factor in our determination. 
Finally, we adopt the hearing officer's conclusion that the strike 
was not caused by provocative conduct on the part of the County but resulted 
from the Chapter's failure to achieve the agreement it wanted, its resentment 
at the County's hard bargaining, and the legislative imposition of terms and 
conditions of employment. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the COUNTY OF COLUMBIA to cease deducting 
dues on behalf of THE COLUMBIA COUNTY CHAPTER OF THE 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. and THE 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. for a period 
of one year, commencing on the first practicable date 
after the date of this decision. Thereafter no dues 
shall be deducted on their behalf by the COUNTY OF 
COLUMBIA until respondents affirm that they no longer 
assert the right to strike against any government, as 
required by the provisions of Section 210.3(g) of the 
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P u b l i c E m p l o y e e s ' F a i r Employment A c t . 
DATED: New York, New York 
June 1 5 , 1977. 
HEll's'BY, C h a i r m a n 
ihtAlA>./G 
/JOSEPH R. CROWLEY 
%U B<u 
IDA KLAUS 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT EELATIONS BOARD 
# 2 0 6 / 1 5 / 7 7 
^ x 
In the Matter of 
ORANGE COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Respondent, : 
- . -and.- _. _. _. 
: Case No. U-2307 
ORANGE COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE FACULTY 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
x 
On October 15, 1976 the Orange County Community College Faculty 
Association (charging party) filed a charge against the County of Orange 
(respondent) which, as amended, alleged that respondent violated Section 
209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees'Fair Employment Act (Act)„ in that it 
increased faculty workload and failed to pay salary increments after the 
expiration on August .31, 1976 of a collectively negotiated agreement between 
the parties. 
In his decision, the hearing officer dismissed the charge insofar 
as it alleged a violation by reason of respondent's having unilaterally 
increased faculty workload. The evidence ^persuaded him that faculty 
assignments for the academic year commencing in September, 1976 were within 
the load maxima of the expired contract. No exceptions have been taken 
with respect to this part of his decision. Respondent, however, has filed 
exceptions to that part of the hearing officer's decision which finds it in 
violation of Section 209-a.l(d) by reason of its having failed to pay 
salary increments commencing September 1976. Those exceptions argue that 
the evidence does not support the hearing officer's finding that there was 
4760 
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a past practice of paying increments. We do not have to reach that question. 
On May 12, 1977,which was after the hearing officer's decision 
was issued, the New York State Court of Appeals rendered its decision in 
Matter of BOCES Rockland County v. PERB, N.Y. 2d . 
In that decision, the Court of Appeals ruled: 
"r. ithat-it-was error for PERB to determine that-BOCES 
had violated its duty to negotiate in good faith solely 
because of its failure to pay increments after the 
expiration of an employment agreement." [ 
The reasoning of the Court of Appeals in the Rockland County case is 
applicable here. 
Accordingly, the decision of the hearing officer must be 
reversed. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
June 15, 1977 
ROBERT D.^ rfELS~BY/' Chairman 
JQS'EPlf R. CROWLEY ~~T 
/ 
o r 
s~-£rfSi 
IDA KLAUS 
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• STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NYACK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
RAMONA FINKELMAN, 
Charging Party. 
# 2 D - 6 / 1 6 / 7 7 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2506 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Ramona Finkelman 
(charging party) to the decision of a hearing officer granting the motion 
of the Nyack Union Free School District (respondent) to dismss the charge. 
That charge, which was filed on January 14, 1977, alleged that respondent 
violated §§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
by discharging charging party at the end of her probationary period. 
FACTS 
Charging party participated in a strike against respondent in October 
and November 1975. While engaging in picketing, charging party suffered an 
accident; her foot was run over by an automobile. The incident received 
much publicity within the commuhity and drew particular attention to'- charging 
party's participation in the strike. 
Because of their strike activity, most of respondent's teachers, 
including the charging party, were placed on probationary status, as provided 
in §210.2(f) of the Act. Before the conclusion of the probationary period of 
those teachers, respondent's board of education instructed its administrative 
staff to evaluate their services in order to determine whether the performance 
of any had been unsatisfactory during the probationary period. Charging 
party's performance was determined to be unsatisfactory by her building princi-
pal, and respondent's superintendent afforded her an opportunity to resign. 
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She declined to do so. Thereafter, at its meeting of November 9, 1976, 
respondent's board of education adopted a resolution discharging her. At 
that same meeting, a resolution was adopted granting tenure to all other 
teachers who had participated in the strike, including two who had been 
jailed for contempt of court as a result of their leadership of the strike. 
Their performance had not been found to be unsatisfactory. 
The charging "party's position was that her termination was a reprisal 
for her participation in the strike and was designed to deter future strike 
activity by other employees. She maintained that she was singled out for ; 
reprisal because of the notoriety she attained as a result of her accident 
during the strike. The hearing officer rejected her position. He determined 
that there was no evidence that anti-union animus played any role in charging 
party's dismissal. Accordingly, he granted respondent's motion to dismiss 
the charge. 
EXCEPTIONS AND RESPONSE 
1 
Charging party's exceptions to the hearing officer's decision allege 
that the hearing officer erred in that he failed to find that the discharge 
was the result of anti-union amimus. The brief in support of the exceptions 
urges that such animus is reflected in the fact that the strike leaders were 
evaluated by the superintendent of schools, while the other striking teachers 
were evaluated by their principals. According to charging party, this 
difference in treatment implies that there was a design to give the strike 
leaders negative evaluations. That design, according to charging party, was 
frustrated, however, by the principals of the schools in which the strike 
_1 Charging party has asked for an opportunity to present oral argument in 
support of her exceptions. Having reviewed the briefs and the record, 
we determine that there is no need for oral argument and we, therefore, 
do not grant this request. 
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leaders taught because they accompanied the superintendent into the classroom 
while the strike leaders were being evaluated. This prevented the superinten-
dent from making an inaccurate evaluation. Charging party maintains that 
she was dismissed because she was publicly identified with the strike and 
that her unsatisfactory evaluation was merely a pretext for the discharge. 
Respondent urges that the exceptions be dismissed on the ground that 
they were not filed within the time authorized by §204.10 of our Rules. In 
the alternative, it urges that the hearing officer's decision be affirmed on 
the merits. 
DISCUSSION 
The hearing officer's decision was received by the charging party on 
April 15, 1977. Section 204.10 of our Rules provides that exceptions must be 
filed within fifteen working days after receipt of that decision. Thus, the 
filing should have taken place on or before May 6. Filing is defined by 
§200.10 of our Rules as "personal service upon the Board or an agent thereof, 
or the act of mailing to the Board, not less that two days before the due 
date of any filing." The exceptions herein were mailed to this Board on 
May 6, 1977. Thus, as a technical matter, they were late and cannot be 
considered. 
We do not, however, reject the exceptions without some comment 
regarding their merits. We believe that the evidence supports the hearing 
officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Charging party's argument 
that the respondent's anti-union animus and its intention to give the 
strike leaders unsatisfactory evaluations is established by the fact that 
they were evaluated by the superintendent is too conjectural, particularly, 
when the superintendent evaluated them as satisfactory. Moreover, it is 
significant that charging party was evaluated by her principal and not by 
the .superintendent. ••'•'"••:•• 
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We also note that the provisions of §209-a of the Act are designed 
to safeguard public employees against retaliation for engaging in activities 
that are protected by the Act. Charging party alleges that she was discharged 
as a consequence of her participation in a strike, in part as a reprisal for 
-that- participation- and in part- to deter future strikes by. others.- ....A_strike, 
by public employees is not a protected activity. On the contrary, it is an 
activity that is expressly prohibited and for which specific penalties 
and procedures for their enforcement are prescribed by §210.2 of the Act, 
Tuller v. Cent. Dist. No. 1, 40 NY 487 (1976). Therefore, an allegation, such 
as "J is - implied here, that a penalty imposed upon a striker exceeds the limi-
tations inherent in §210.2 of the Act, cannot be the basis of an improper 
practice charge. The Act assigns to PERB no role in connection with the 
imposition of penalties against individual strikers. Such an allegation 
should be directed to the courts. 
NOW, THEREFORE, we dismiss the exceptions, and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby 
is dismissed. 
Dated: June 16, 1977 
New York, New York 
ROBERT D. HELSBY\ Chairman 
yJEPH & rpnm IF 
cTl&eL A--*-4L<si^n_ 
IDA KLAUS 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
v . #2E-6/16/77 
In the Matter of 
SCIO-ALLENTOWN TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
: BOARD DECISION & ORDER 
Respondent, 
- and - : 
- -GAS-E--No-.—U--2-2-7-4- -
WAYNE LEWIS JUDKINS, 
Charging Party. 
This matter comes to us upon the exceptions of Wayne Lewis 
Judkins, the charging party herein from a decision of a hearing officer • 
granting the motion of the Scio-Allentown Teachers Association, respondent 
herein, to dismiss the charge. The charge had alleged that respondent had 
violated Section 209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) by refusing to submit the charging party's grievance to the appellate 
levels of the contractual grievance procedure. Section 209-a.2(a) declares 
it to be an improper -practice for an employee1 •' :* 
organization "to interfere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the 
exercise of the rights granted in section two hundred two...." Section 202 
of the Act, in turn, assures public employees of "the -right to form, join 
and participate in, or to refrain from forming, joining, or participating 
in, any employee organization of their own choosing." 
FACTS 
Charging party, an officer of respondent Association, was advised 
by the employer in early March, 1976 that he was not being recommended for 
tenure. He was given an opportunity to present his case to three teacher 
7ot> 
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members of the Fair Dismissal Committee. That Committee was created by the 
agreement between respondent and the employer and is comprised of both 
employee and management members. Some time later, the full Fair Dismissal 
Committee met, after which a teacher-member of the Committee advised charging 
party that "things did not look good" for him and that respondent could not 
help him. 
On April 15, 1976, charging party was notified that his probationary 
appointment as a teacher would be terminated on June 30. Charging party filed 
a grievance claiming that the employer's action violated the fair dismissal 
clause of the contract. The grievance was denied at the first level by the 
supervising principal. Charging- party then asked respondent's president 
to take the grievance to the second level (the school board) of the 
grievance procedure. Respondent's president replied in writing: 
"I have reviewed your case with the Association Committee 
on Fair Dismissal and Grievance (Executive Board), and it 
was again stated that it is the opinion of the committee, 
the Board of Education followed the Fair Dismissal pro-
cedure. .. [and] the committee finds the grievance not to 
be meritorious." 
He was, however, permitted to carry his own grievance forward and he did so; 
but the school board too rejected the grievance. Charging party then 
requested respondent to submit his grievance to the third level, which is 
binding arbitration, and again respondent's president advised him that it 
would not do so because it had determined that the grievance was not 
meritorious. 
On June 17, 1976, the charging party submitted the grievance to 
arbitration himself, but the employer obtained a stay of the arbitration. He 
also sought to meet with respondent's grievance committee, but his efforts 
767 
Board - U-2274 -3 
were unsuccessful. At the end of July, the court proceedings were discontinued 
by stipulation and the demand for arbitration was withdrawn. 
The hearing officer determined that these facts did not establish 
a violation by respondent of its duty under the Act to represent the charging 
party fairly. 
EXCEPTIONS •" -• " 
The exceptions complain that the hearing officer failed to rule on 
the allegation that respondent's conduct violated charging party's statutory 
right of organization under Section 202 of the Act and his right to repre-
sentation under Section 203 of the Act. They also complain that the 
respondent had not followed the internal review and screening procedures 
specified in its Constitution and. By-laws when it declined to present charging 
party's grievance. Those procedures specify that grievances would be 
considered by a teacher's education and professional standards committee but 
no such committee had. ever been created. Moreover, after the first stage, the 
respondent's executive board itself is supposed to hear and evaluate a grievance 
or to designate a committee to hear and evaluate the grievance in order to 
determine its merits prior to deciding whether or not to advance it to a 
1/ 
succeeding stage. According to charging party, this was not done because 
his meeting with the teachers' representatives on the Fair Dismissal 
Committee occurred even before any grievance was filed. 
1/ The contract provides: 
"...if the aggrieved person is not satisfied with the decision made at 
level one, he shall submit his grievance to the Executive Board of the 
Association, or a committee designated by the Executive Board to hear such 
grievances. If the Executive Board or its designated committee deems the 
grievance to be meritorious, it shall refer the grievance to the 
President of the Board of Education." 
Board - U-2274 
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DISCUSSION 
Although the procedures specified in respondent's Constitution and 
By-laws were not followed, it appears from the record that the departures from 
the specified procedures were not prejudicial to charging party because the 
alternative procedures offered to him gave him an opportunity to have the basis 
of his grievance evaluated by a responsible body of respondent. The hearing 
officer concluded: 
"[I]t is apparent from the record that Judkins was given the 
opportunity to fully present his case to a committee of the 
Association which found his grievance^ ./ to be non-
meritorious, or at least, not of sufficient merit to 
warrant further action.^ .' It is likewise apparent that 
other grievances have been found to be 'non-meritorious' 
by the Association without the formal designation of the 
level-two grievance committee...." 
7/ Although Judkins' meeting with this committee 
occurred prior to the filing of the grievance, 
there is nothing in the record to indicate that 
the issues raised before it were different than 
those raised by the grievance. 
8/ It should be noted that an employee organization 
has no obligation to process every grievance, 
regardless of merit or effect, to completion." 
The record supports this conclusion. The charging party was not denied his 
right of organization under Section 202 of the Act, an essential element of 
the charge. Neither was he denied his right of representation under Section 
203 of the Act. An employee's right to be represented by an employee 
organization in the administration of grievances arising under a contract is 
not absolute. It is limited by the prerogative of the employee organization 
to refuse to pursue grievances that it reasonably determines, after due 
and proper investigation and deliberation, to be non-meritorious. The grievanc 
herein was not pursued by respondent after such deliberation for apparently 
valid reasons and it so advised the charging party. We note that the grievance 
could not, in any event, have been processed because its basis was that the 
charging party was denied tenure at the end of his probationary period. The 
4 A>3 
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Court of Appeals has determined that the granting or withholding of tenure 
is a non-delegable responsibility of a school board. An employee's complaint 
that he has been denied tenure because of a determination of the employer on 
the merits is not grievable even if it is in violation of a collectively 
negotiated contract. Matter of Cohoes City School District v. Cohoes Teachers 
-Association, 40 NY 2d 774 (1976). 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the hearing officer granting 
respondent's motion to dismiss the charge herein, and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be dismissed. 
Dated: New York, New York 
June 16, 1977 
^OBERT ^T^ELISBY, Chairman 
JOSEPH/R. CROWLEY 
G$UL^ /Zx^ul^L^-^ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2F-6/16/77 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF NEW ROCHELLE, 
Respondent, 
-and-
POLICE ASSOCIATION OF NEW ROCHELLE, 
NEW YORK, INC., 
Charging Party. 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Police Association of 
New Rochelle, New York, Inc. (charging party) to the decision of a hearing 
officer dismissing its charge. It had charged the City of New Rochelle 
(respondent) with a violation of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act(Act), 
1 
Sections 209-a.l(a) and (dj in that respondent threatened to lay off employees 
in the negotiating unit represented by the charging party unless the charging 
party withdrew its contract demands and waived its statutory right to com-
pulsory interest arbitration under Section 209.4(c) of the Act. In order to 
establish a violation of Section 209-a.l(d), charging party must prove that 
respondent acted unilaterally with respect to a matter about which it should 
have negotiated. A violation of Section 209-a.l(a) may be established even 
with respect to a non-mandatory subject of negotiation if charging party 
proves that respondent's motivation in making the unilateral change was a 
design to weaken or embarrass it. 
The hearing offficer determined that the record evidence did not 
support either part of the charge. The relevant facts, as properly found by 
1 These subsections of the Act make it an improper employer practice to 
deliberately, "(a)... interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the 
exercise of their rights guaranteed in section two hundred two for the 
purpose of depriving them of such rights [and to] (d)...refuse to negotiate 
in good faith with the duly recognized or certified representatives of its 
employees." 4 7 7 J 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-1985 
Board - U-1985 -2 
the hearing officer, are set forth. Respondent's City Manager proposed a 
budget that called for a twelve percent "across-the-board" layoff of employees 
in all departments, including employees represented by the charging party, 
and several unit employees were laid off. This transpired at a time when 
charging party and respondent were in negotiations for a successor agreement 
to one that was about to expire and had not been concluded as of the time 
of the close of the record. After proposing the layoffs and again, after 
initiating them, respondent's City Manager met with the charging party and 
three other employee organizations to discuss what could be done to avoid 
the layoffs. On these facts, the hearing officer concluded that the layoffs 
were not motivated by anti-union animus or by a design to frustrate the 
charging party's negotiating rights under the Taylor Law; rather, their sole 
basis was respondent's operating deficit. 
Charging party would have us conclude that, because notice of the 
layoffs was given during negotiations, that notice was inherently threatening 
to it and destructive of its right to negotiate. The timing of the decision 
and notice in this case is adequately explained by its relationship to res-
pondent's budget making calendar. The evidence supports the hearing officer's 
determination that, at the meetings respondent "explained why the layoffs were 
necessary and indicated their willingness to discuss any proposals the 
charging party might bring forward...." We therefore find no indication of the 
improper motivation that would establish a violation of §209-a.l(a). 
A public employer may lay off employees for economic reasons and 
it is not required to negotiate about its decision to do so. Matter of New 
Rochelle, 4 PERB ^ [3060. 
Lk i ii fa 
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ACCORDINGLY, we affirm the hearing officer's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in 
its entirety. 
Dated: New York, New York 
June 16, 1977 
lobert D. Hefsbyy^Chairman 
Joseph R. Crowley \ / 
Ida Klaus 
f h-NHi< 
#26-6/16/77 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BRADFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
- and -
BRADFORD TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
x 
INTERIM DECISION 
Case No. U-2328 
-x 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Bradford 
Teachers Association, charging party herein, from a hearing officer's 
decision dismissing the charge. That charge alleges that the Bradford 
Central School District, respondent herein, violated Sections 209-a.l(a), (b), 
and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when its supervising 
principal and board of education criticized and discredited the president of 
the charging party for issuing a press release concerning scholarships and 
prizes awarded by the charging party to graduating high school students. 
Charging party submitted a brief in support of its exceptions to 
which the respondent replied by letter. Thereafter, both parties were given 
an opportunity to present oral argument and the charging party did so. Ata 
oral argument we indicated that the record contains .neither the press 
release referred to in the charge nor sufficient information regarding its 
language, and we asked the charging party to produce a copy of it. It has 
been unable to do so. 
We find such evidence to be necessary to complete the record. 
Accordingly, this matter is remanded to the hearing officer with 
instructions to reopen the record for the limited purpose of obtaining a 
4774 
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copy of the press release, if possible and evidence relating to it. 
Dated: New York, New York 
June 16, 1977 
ROBERT D. HELSBY, Chairman 
<tf 
</MMi,n,LUJU» 
JOSEPH/R. CROWLEY 
Q 
^U,- AMi M.^t* 
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In the Matter of 
CITY OF AMSTERDAM, 
- and -
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS LT. >'iD 
Employer, 
AMSTERDAM POLICE BENEVOLENT 
(ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
- and- -
TEAMSTERS UNION, LOCAL 294, 
Intervenor. 
#2H-6/16/77 
CASE NO.' C-1369 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE -•• 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Boerd in. accor-
dance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative, has been selected; . 
Pursuant to the-authority vested in 'the Board by the . 
(Public Employees' Fair Employment Act,' 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Amsterdam Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. -
,ias been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
3f the above-named public employer, -in the unit described below,-
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of coileccive 
legotiations and the settlement of grievances.-
Jn.it: UNIT I — INCLUDED: ' All Policemen within the Public 
Safety Department. 
EXCLUDED: The chiefs and deputy chiefs. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above-named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Amsterdam Police Benevolent 
"ssociation, inc. 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
pith regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
Betermination of, and administration of,.grievances. 
Signed on the 15th day of June , 19 77 • " 
Robert D. Helsby, ' Chairman 
/Joseph R, Crowley 
c ^ < 4u i i 477c 
-Se^.^-7,,-
Ida Klaus 
